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I. Introduction
Chronic ill health and the prospect of premature mortality haunt bil-
lions of people around the developing world. Few goals can be more
worthy than that of ameliorating these burdens. Today, there exists a
widespread belief that significant improvements in health are within
reach of affordable policy interventions, whether led by governments
or by large‐scale philanthropies. There also exists a widespread consen-
sus that improving the health of people in poor countries will lead to
significant economic gains. The prospect of such economic benefits is
often cited as an important secondary justification for health initiatives.
For example, the report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health (2001), chaired by Jeffrey Sachs, finds evidence that health is
one of the most important determinants of a country’s economic suc-
cess. Similarly, the Abuja Declaration of 2000, signed by 53 African
headsofstate,notesthat“malariahasslowedeconomicgrowthinAfrican
countriesby1.3%peryearas aresultofwhich GDPforAfricancountries
is now 37% lower than it would have been in the absence of malaria.”
1
In this paper we assess the claim that improvements in health lead to
increases in economic growth. Our findings are not supportive of the
popularly held view. We find that large improvements in health lead,
in the long run, to modest increases in GDP per capita. Further, these
increases in GDP per capita take several decades to arrive. Controlling
specific diseases that have a high burden in developing countries would
also produce small effects. For example, we find that the effect of eradi-
cating malaria in a typical sub‐Saharan country would be to raise GDP
per capita by only about 2% in the long run. Our evidence thus suggests
that proponents of efforts to improve health in developing countries
should rely on humanitarian rather than economic arguments.
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978‐0‐226‐00204‐0/2009/2008‐0301$10.00Existing research on the effects of health on economic outcomes uses
data at both the microeconomic (household) and macroeconomic (coun-
try) levels. Microeconomists have found extensive evidence that an in-
dividual’s health is an important determinant of his or her economic
performance. Various measures of poor health, including malnutrition,
anemia, and exposure to disease in utero and during childhood, have
all been shown to have a negative effect on a person’s wages or produc-
tivity. At the macroeconomic level, there is a strong positive correlation
between income per capita and life expectancy or other measures of
health. Thus there is a prima facie case for believing that health im-
provements will make a country richer.
Drawing a macroeconomic conclusion directly from either the micro-
economic evidence or the cross‐sectional correlation is problematic,
however. Outcomes of microeconomic studies are often measured in
units that do not map immediately into macroeconomic effects. More
important, microeconomic studies are unable to control for general
equilibrium effects of changes in population health. For example, an in-
crease in life expectancy may lead to a larger population, in turn reduc-
ing available resources per capita and possibly undoing the economic
benefits of better health. However, macroeconomic cross‐country re-
gressions that could potentially capture these effects typically suffer
from omitted variables bias and reverse causation problems. In an im-
portant recent study, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) conclude that,
when the problems of health’s endogeneity and omitted variables are
corrected, health improvements in the period after World War II actu-
ally had a negative effect on income per capita.
Our goal in this paper is to answer the macroeconomic question of
how much national income can be raised by exogenous health improve-
ments by building up from microeconomic estimates, using a simulation
model. Our model requires the specification of three sets of functional
relationships and parameters: those involving the effect of health on la-
bor productivity and other aspects of human capital, those involving
the demographic response to health and mortality changes, and those
involving the aggregate production function. Relative to reduced‐form
econometrics, our methodology is well suited to highlighting the causal
mechanisms behind changes in output per capita and therefore by im-
plication which sets of policies or behavioral variables are likely to have
a quantitatively significant effect on the relationship between health
and income.
We apply the model to two distinct types of exogenous changes in
health. The first is an increase in life expectancy, treating life expectancy
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ticular, we consider the effect of exogenously raising life expectancy at
birth from 40 to 60 years. This approximately corresponds with the
most dramatic improvement in health observed during the interna-
tional epidemiological transition studied by Acemoglu and Johnson.
The key finding from these simulations is that even large increases in
life expectancy, which could raise per capita income in the long run by
around 15%, may reduce income by up to 5% for 30–40 years or more
after the shock.
The second type of change in health we consider is the eradication of
particular diseases. Our results focus on two infectious diseases that are
particularly prevalent in the developing world: malaria and tuberculo-
sis. These simulations have two key results. The first is that, for either of
the diseases considered, even complete eradication has a relatively
small impact on income per capita in either the short or the long run,
not exceeding a few percentage points. The second is that these rela-
tively small effects vary by disease. For example, in the short run, erad-
icating tuberculosis raises income per capita whereas eradicating
malaria lowers it. The different effects on income of eradicating these
diseases arise largely because tuberculosis strikes mostly prime‐age
workers, whereas malaria affects mainly young children.
The simulation‐based methodology allows us to take into account
bothgeneralequilibriumeffectsandthedynamiceffectofhealththrough
channels including the evolution of the size and age structure of the
population, capital accumulation, and resource crowding. The analysis
is well adapted to considering the dynamic path of the economy over
the course of this evolution, rather than merely comparing steady states,
and to providing a quantitative characterization of this evolution in the
face of particular interventions. The simulation approach also permits
analysis of the strength of the various mechanisms at work. For instance,
it is straightforward to examine the sensitivity of the results to different
estimates of the effect of disease on effective labor supply or the speed
of the demographic transition.
Our exercise should not be mistaken for an analysis of the welfare
impacts of health improvements. The primary benefits from health im-
provements are in terms of lives saved and suffering avoided. The issue
we study—whether there are also effects on income per capita—is of
minor importance in welfare terms. Similarly, while it might be interest-
ing to ask whether health improvements of the sort that we study could
be “self‐financing,” we do not go down this path. Among other things,
we do not have any estimate of the cost of the health improvements we
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ing for them.
A more profitable use of the analysis, in our view, is to suggest poli-
cies that are complementary to health improvements in terms of raising
income per capita. We see three areas in which this is particularly rele-
vant. First, we find that health improvements can result in large popu-
lation increases that can have a significant negative effect on income per
capitaoveranextendedperiod.Providingwomenwithsufficientknowl-
edge of, and access to, a range of family‐planning options may amelio-
ratethiseffect.Second,oneimportantchannelthroughwhichpopulation
increases reduce income per capita is capital shallowing. Therefore, pol-
icies and institutions that enable a sizable and sustained current‐account
deficit without incurring unduly high interest burdens are likely to be
particularly important following an increase in life expectancy. Finally,
many or most health interventions have the largest effect on infant mor-
tality and therefore are likely to lead to a substantial increase in the
number of children. Since increased human capital formation is likely
to be optimal following an improvement in health and is an important
factor offsetting population pressure, it is particularly important to en-
sure an adequate supply of teachers and school facilities in the years
following public health improvements.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the
model and discusses our choice of base case parameters. Section III pre-
sents simulation results for the base case model and then discusses the
sensitivityofresultstoalteringourparameterassumptions.InSectionIV,
we consider the eradication of two specific diseases: malaria and tuber-
culosis. We discuss how the model has to be altered and present simula-
tion results. Section V presents concluding remarks.
II. The Model and Its Parameterization
Health affects income through a number of channels, and the dynamics
of these effects can be stretched out over several decades. Thus, analyz-
ing the effect of a health intervention entails comparing the complete
paths of income and other endogenous variables in the scenario in
which the intervention takes place to an alternative in which it does
not. Similarly, alternative parameter assumptions regarding the differ-
ent components of the model will yield different dynamic paths of all
the endogenous variables.
We consider two different sorts of health interventions. First, we con-
sider a “general” health improvement. Specifically, we consider a shift
Ashraf, Lester, and Weil 160in life expectancy at birth from e0 ¼ 40 to e0 ¼ 60 usinga model life table.
Second, weconsider theeradication oftwospecificdiseases: malariaand
tuberculosis.
The model features both demographic and economic elements. The
demographic elements comprise estimates of mortality and fertility
by age. The economic elements include the specification of the aggre-
gate production function and the specification of the response of vari-
ables such as human capital to changes in health. We consider each
element in turn.
A. Demographic Structure
The demographic part of the model takes age‐specific mortality and fer-
tility schedules as inputs. Figures 1 and 2 show the data that we use for
analyzing a general health I mprovement. Figure 1 shows the probabil-
ity of survival to different ages at life expectancies of 40 (before the
health improvement) and 60 (after the improvement), using the female
model life table for the South Asia region from the United Nations
(1982).
2 Figure 2 shows age‐specific fertility data for Sri Lanka in 1953
from Keyfitz and Flieger (1968), which we take as a measure of ferti-
lity before the general health improvement. These data are among the
earliest available and should capture much of the relevant demographic
Fig. 1. Survivorship functions, UN model life table, South Asia
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In practice, population is divided into 5‐year age groups, and each time
period in our model corresponds to 5 years.
We assume that prior to the health improvement, fertility and mor-
tality rates have been constant for long enough that the population is
stable (i.e., the relative sizes of different age groups are constant, as is
the growth rate of the population). The health improvement switches
the country immediately to the new mortality schedule.
3 A critical com-
ponent of the model is what happens to fertility rates when mortality
changes. We assume that in the long run, fertility adjusts proportionally
at each age such that the growth rate of the population eventually re-
turns toits preshock level. We further assume that the adjustment in age‐
specific fertility occurs in a linear fashion over some transition period.
Estimates of the appropriate length of this fertility transition period
are difficult to come by. We assume as a base case a transition period of
50 years. This fertility adjustment is a little slower than some accounts
of the East Asian demographic transition, which suggest a period of
about25–30years,butseemsquiteconsistentwithevidencefromEurope
and India and perhaps even a little optimistic in Africa (see Lee, Mason,
and Miller [2001] for a brief summary of the evidence). Below we test the
sensitivity of our results to different assumptions regarding the length of
the transition period. When we consider the eradication of a specific dis-
eases inSection IV,weuse atableof age‐specific deathsfromthat disease
Fig. 2. Fertility schedule, Sri Lanka, 1953
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tions about the response of fertility to mortality decline.
Figure 3 shows the sizes of the overall population and of the working‐
age and dependent‐age segments of the population, all relative to the
baseline in which no improvement in health takes place. Population in
the health improvement scenario stabilizes at roughly 1.5 times the size
of the baseline (note that population is growing at an annual rate of 1.5%
in the baseline case; growth reaches 2.5% in the decade following the
health improvement). Because of demographic momentum, this stabili-
zation takes longer than the 50 years that we assume it takes fertility to
adjust. For the first 40 years of the transition, the ratio of dependents to
working‐age adults is higher in the health improvement scenario than in
the baseline. This effect peaks about 15 years after the shock, at which
time the dependency ratio has increased by about 0.10, from about
0.69 to about 0.79. Thereafter, the dependency ratio gradually declines
to a long‐run level of about 0.64. In the long run, therefore, there is a de-
mographic dividend in terms of income per capita from the decline in
mortality, but this occurs only more than half a century after the shock.
B. Production and Physical Capital Accumulation
In our base case model, aggregate production is given by a standard
Cobb‐Douglas production function. The factor inputs are land (which
Fig. 3. Effect of the life expectancy shock on population size
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t X1 α β;
whereα þ β ≤ 1,Xisafixedarbitrarystockofland,andAt isproductivity.
We assume fairly standard values for factor shares: we set α ¼ 0:3
and β ¼ 0:6, meaning that the implied share of land is 10%. In a later
section we revisit the role of fixed factors of production. We consider
the sensitivity of our results to both the share of land in national income
and the elasticity of substitution between land and other factors of pro-
duction. We also examine data on natural resource shares of national
income.
Productivity grows at an exogenous rate that does not respond to any
of the changes in the model. For convenience, the growth rate is set to
equal the steady‐state rate of population growth times the share of land,
so that income per capita is constant in the steady state. Because all our
results entail a comparison of income in the case of a health intervention
to the case in which no intervention takes place, the underlying rate of
technological change is of very little importance.
We handle capital accumulation extremely simply, by making the
Solovian assumption that a fixed share of national income is saved in
each period.
4 Accordingly, the stock of capital in period t, Kt,e v o l v e s
over time according to
Ktþ1 ¼ sYt þð 1   δÞKt;
where s and δ are the fixed saving and depreciation rates, respectively.
Weassumethat theannualsavingsrateis10%,whichisclosetotheaver-
age for countries in sub‐Saharan Africa, and assign a standard value to
the depreciation rate of 5%. Below we also consider the case of an econ-
omy open to international capital flows.
C. Human Capital
We model an individual’s human capital as a function of his or her
schooling, experience, and health. We assume that human capital inputs
of individuals with different characteristics are perfectly substitutable.





i;t   hs
i;t   he
i;tÞNi;t;
Ashraf, Lester, and Weil 164where Ni;t is the number of individuals of age i in the population in pe-
riod t. We assume that children enter the labor force at 15 and workers
leave the labor force at 65.
Our treatment of schooling and experience is standard. Years of
schooling are aggregated into human capital from schooling using
the piecewise log‐linear specification
hs
i;t ¼
exp ðθ1SÞ if S ≤ 4
exp ½4θ1 þ θ2ðS   4Þ  if 4 < S ≤ 8




where we use values of θ1 ¼ 0:134, θ2 ¼ 0:101, and θ3 ¼ 0:068, based on
Hall and Jones (1999). The return to schooling will be relevant for the
exercises we conduct because improvements in health will raise the
average level of schooling.
Human capital from on‐the‐job experience for a worker of age i in
any period t, he
i;t, is computed as
he
i;t ¼ exp½ ði   15Þþψði   15Þ
2 ;
where, on the basis of Bils and Klenow (2000), who provide an estimate
of the average return to experience in a sample of 48 countries, we use a
ϕ value of 0.0495 and a value of −0.0007 for ψ. Experience will play a
role in our simulations because declines in mortality and fertility will
lead to a population with higher average age and thus higher average
experience.
1. Human Capital from Health
We use two different methods of parameterizing the effects of a general
health improvement (i.e., an increase in life expectancy at birth from 40
to 60) on human capital. The first method for modeling the effect of a gen-




of 60, conditional on having attained the age of 15 using the current life
table. Weil estimates the structural coefficient linking the log of human
capital in the form of health to ASR as 0.653. To give a concrete example
of the size of this effect, a change in life expectancy at birth from 40 to
60 corresponds, using the UN female model life table for the South Asia
When Does Improving Health Raise GDP? 165region, to a change in the ASR from 0.50 to 0.72. Applying the coefficient
above implies an increase of 15% in health human capital per worker.
The second method of capturing the direct effect of health improve-
ments on productivity relies on the ratings of disease incidence and se-
verity that are used to construct estimates of years lost due to disability
( Y L D )a r o u n dt h ew o r l db yt h eW o r l dH e a l t hO r g a n i z a t i o n( W H O ) .
The WHO provides a general measure of YLDs and then also measures
disease‐specific YLDs, both broken down by age group. A country’s
YLD for a given disease is constructed as
YLD ¼ I   DW   L;
where I is the number of incident (newly arising) cases in a period, DW
is the disability weight attached to the disease, and L is the average
duration of the disease until remission or death. The crucial parameter
here is the disability weight, which is intended to be a cardinal measure
of the severity of different diseases or impairments, on a scale from 0,
indicating perfect health, to 1, indicating death. Disability weights are
constructed by panels of health care providers and medical experts
using a “person trade‐off” protocol that establishes utility equivalences
betweenyearsoflifelivedindifferentstatesofhealth.Oneyearlivedwith
a disability provides the same utility as 1   DW years lived disability‐
free(Murray1996).Disabilityweightsarethereforenotprimarilyintended
asameasureoflaborsupply.Nevertheless,theseestimatesprovideatleast
some basis for comparing the effects of different diseases, as well as a
cross‐check on the results using the ASR parameter discussed earlier.
5
Because YLD data play a significant role in the analysis below, it is
worth exploring these data in more detail. Table 1 shows data from the
Table 1
Per Capita YLDs for Males, Afro E Region
Ages 0–4 Ages 30–44
All causes .1662 .1352
Communicable, maternal, perinatal,
and nutritional conditions .1084 .0406




Noncommunicable diseases .0450 .0717
Injuries .0129 .0228
Source: WHO, Global Burden of Disease (2002), revised estimates.
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adult mortality). We look at per capita YLDs for men in the 30–44 age
group and boys aged 0–4. Overall, the men average 13.5% of a YLD
per capita per year, with one‐third of this burden coming from infectious
and parasitic diseases. HIV/AIDS makes up half of the infectious disease
burden,whereasthetwodiseasesthatweconsiderbelowmakerelatively
small contributions. Tuberculosis accounts for 0.005 YLDs, or 3.5% of the
disabilityburden,andmalariaaccountsforonly0.001YLDs,or1%ofthe
total disability burden. The boys average 16.6% of a YLD per capita per
year, with two‐thirds of the burden coming from infectious diseases.
To assess the effect on worker productivity from a general health im-
provement (i.e., an increase in life expectancy at birth from 40 to 60), we
need a mapping from life expectancy to YLDs. We construct this map-
ping by looking at cross‐sectional data from 14 WHO subregions on
YLDs per capita and life expectancy at birth. Figure 4 shows the data
for the full population. In practice, we work with similar data at the age
group level (each group spans approximately 15 years for most of the
working‐agepopulation).Foreachagegroup,werunaregressionacross
the14subregionsofYLDspercapitaonlifeexpectancyatbirth.Thecoef-
ficients from these regressions then tell us the change in age‐specific
YLDs that would result from an increase in life expectancy from 40 to
60. To give a concrete example, the regression of YLDs per capita on life
Fig. 4. YLD per capita and life expectancy at birth
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rentheses) is
YLD ¼ 0:251   0:00226e0; R2 ¼ 0:88:
ð0:017Þð 0:0002Þ
When these regression coefficients are applied, a change in life expec-
tancy at birth from40 to 60 would lower YLDs from0.160 to 0.115. Using
YLDs to measure the impact of disease on labor input is complicated,
however, by the fact that diseases at one age may result in disability at
another.Forexample,acripplingdiseasesufferedinchildhoodwillcause
disability in adulthood. To take account of this we make the (admittedly
extreme) assumption that all YLDs incurred in childhood result in adult
disability. Specifically, we spread the YLDs incurred at ages 0–14 evenly
over adults aged 15–64. From the regressions just described, annual
YLDs for ages 0–4 fall from 0.221 to 0.148 and annual YLDs for ages
5–14 fall from 0.075 to 0.055. Thus implied YLDs at each adult age
due to childhood illness fall from 0.037 to 0.026. The implied labor input
peradult inthe 30–44agegroup afterthehealth improvement relativeto
before the improvement is thus ð1   0:115   0:026Þ=ð1   0:160   0:037Þ,
or a 7.0% increase. Similarly, the implied increases in labor input per
worker in the 15–29 and 45–59 age groups are 6.1% and 6.6%, respec-
tively. These effects are slightly less than half the size of the effects we
estimate using the data on ASR. In the simulations below, we use the
ASR estimates as the base case.
2. Phase‐in of Health Effects
Conceptually, both the ASR and YLD estimates are derived from think-
ing about a comparison of workers who have spent their entire lives in
a low or high life expectancy environment. However, in response to a
health intervention, there will be a long transition period in which some
of the labor force will have grown up in a poor health environment. This
is important because there is good evidence that many of the most im-
portant health interventions in terms of worker productivity are those
that affect young children (or even those in utero). Specifically, children
who grow up in a more favorable health environment are healthier in a
number of measurable respects (such as height, IQ, and prevalence of
chronic disease) and perform better as students and workers.
To deal with this problem of phase‐in, we allow a worker’sh e a l t h
human capital to be a function of both the current health environment
Ashraf, Lester, and Weil 168and the health environment that prevailed when he was born. In the
case of the ASR measure, for example, human capital from health per




exp ½ð1   ηÞρASR þ ηρASR′  if T > t   i
expðρASR
′Þ if t   i ≥ T;
 
whereASRandASR′aretheadultsurvivalratesimpliedbythemortality
regimes prevailing before and after the shock, ρ is the parameter that
measures the effect of ASR on worker productivity as estimated by Weil
(2007), and η ∈ ½0;1  captures the importance of the contemporaneous
healthenvironmentinaffectingworkerproductivity.Avalueofη ¼ 1im-
plies that health improvements are fully reflected in worker productivity
right away. A value of η ¼ 0 implies that there is no contemporaneous
effect of health improvement on worker productivity; the only workers
who will be more productive are those who are born after the improve-
ment in health. At this point we have no solid grounds for estimating
the value ofη, andsoinour simulations weuse 0.5as ourbasecase value.
3. The Effect of Health on Education
There are several possible channels through which changes in health
may increase education. Longer life expectancy increases the time over
which investment in human capital can be amortized and therefore
should raise investment in schooling (Kalemli‐Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil
2000). Lower adult mortality also reduces the number of orphans, who
receive less schooling than children with living parents (Case, Paxson,
and Ableidinger 2004). There is some evidence that healthier children
are also better able to take advantage of schooling, for example, through
reduced absenteeism and greater mental alertness while at school
(Bleakley 2007a). Children may also be kept out of school to provide care
for family members who are ill. Another channel is the so‐called quality‐
quantity trade‐off. If disease eradication and the resulting decline in
fertility result in households having fewer surviving children, the
household budget constraint—and,atthemacrolevel,thegovernment’s
budget constraint—may be loosened, allowing greater investment in
each child (Kalemli‐Ozcan 2002).
We calibrate the effect of health on schooling using estimates from
Fortson (2007). Fortson examines how the rise of HIV prevalence has
affected schooling in a set of seven sub‐Saharan countries. She estimates
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pleted schooling by 0.5 year. Fortson also constructs a theoretical model
of optimal schooling’s response to adult mortality, which produces an
effect roughly two‐thirds as large as the one she estimates.
To translate Fortson’s estimate into a form that we can use, we need
to link HIV prevalence and the mortality rate. On the basis of data on
changes in adult mortality and HIV prevalence in her sample, Fortson
estimates that ∂mortality=∂HIV is between 0.06 and 0.09. We use the av-
erage of these two figures, implying that HIV prevalence of 10% would
raise adult mortality by 0.0075. We can similarly translate the health
shock that we are looking at into a change in the adult mortality rate.
Using our model life tables, we calculate adult mortality as the average
of age‐specific mortality for all ages between 15 and 65, weighted by the
age‐specific population of Sri Lanka in 1953. Adult mortality falls from
0.00972to0.00393whenlifeexpectancyatbirthrisesfrom40to60.There-
fore, the implied change in schooling is




In our simulations we thus increase schooling by 0.386 year for all co-
horts born after life expectancy rises from 40 to 60. The effect of this rise
in schooling on the average level of human capital will depend on the
initial level of schooling because, as discussed above, the percentage re-
turn to schooling falls with the number of years of schooling. In our base
case simulation, we consider the case in which initial schooling is below
4 years, so that the return to schooling is 13.4% per year.
D. Other Channels from Health to Income
There are several other potential channels from health to income that
we do not pursue at this stage. Changes in health, particularly through
changes in adult life expectancy, may also cause changes in the savings
rate. Modigliani’s classic life cycle model of savings would suggest that
an increased probability of surviving past the age of effective labor force
participation would increase savings rates in the long run. In the short
run, the demographic bulge of relatively young workers saving at a rela-
tively high rate might also increase capital accumulation relatively
shortly after the shock. Although these mechanisms may be important,
itremainsdifficulttojudge quantitativelyhow important life cyclesav-
ings effects are likely to be in a developing economy. There is a lively
Ashraf, Lester, and Weil 170discussion of the evidence on these issues as they relate to Taiwan in
Deaton (1999) and Lee et al. (2001).
Reduced fertility that accompanies lower mortality will also have a
positive effect on labor supply, particularly for women. This effect has
been explored recently by Bloom et al. (2007) for the case of fertility de-
clines resulting from changes in abortion laws. In the experiment we
consider,ofraisinglife expectancy atbirth from40 to60,the totalfertility
rate falls from 5.16 to 3.72. Thus, the average woman has 1.44 fewer chil-
dren in the healthy regime. However, because much of the difference in
life expectancy results from mortality at young ages, the difference in
time required for child care is much smaller than the difference in the
number of children ever born.
III. Basic Results and Sensitivity
Figure 5 shows the results of our simulation for a “base case” set of
parameters. These are a fertility adjustment period of 50 years, health
impact on productivity calculated according to the ASR methodology, a
phase‐in effect of health on the productivity of those born before the
improvement (the parameter η) of one‐half, initial schooling of less than
4 years, an economy closed to international capital flows, and a land
share in the Cobb‐Douglas production function of 10%. Figure 5 shows
Fig. 5. The base case scenario
When Does Improving Health Raise GDP? 171the levels of human capital per worker, physical capital per worker, out-
put per worker, and output per capita. As in all the figures that follow,
we show results relative to a baseline in which no health improvement
takes place.
The evolution of human capital per worker shows a combination of
the direct effect of the health shock on labor productivity, the increase in




productivity due to health is 15.5%. As is clear from the figure, much of
the benefit of better health for human capital—specifically, all of the
schooling effect, half of the direct health effect, and all of the experience
effect—is subject to a significant time lag.
Physical capital per worker falls following the shock mechanically
because more workers are now alive to work with the same aggregate
amount of capital. Since much of the increase in life expectancy is among
the young, the cohorts entering the labor force after the shock are sub-
stantially larger than earlier incoming cohorts. This has the effect of de-
pressing the capital stock per worker still further. Eventually, as the size
of the population stabilizes, increased savings from the extra workers
lead to a gradual recovery in the capital‐labor ratio. The capital‐labor
ratio reaches a minimum about 30 years after the shock, at which point it
is about 10% lower than it was before the shock.
The path of output per worker reflects the dynamics of human and
physical capital per worker, as well as land per worker (which we do
not show, but which can be inferred from fig. 5). Output per worker
follows an odd path, initially rising from the improvement in worker
productivity due to better health, then falling due to capital and land
dilution from faster population growth, and eventually rising again as
population growth slows and the benefits of better health through
schooling and the productivity of later‐born cohorts phase in. As dis-
cussed above, the demographic dynamics of our model determine the
gap between income per worker and income per capita. For the first 40
or so years after the health improvement, a higher dependency ratio
means that income per capita is lower relative to the baseline than in-
come per worker. In the steady state, income per capita is 3.2% higher
relative to the baseline than income per worker.
Figure 5 shows that in our base case the long‐r u ne f f e c to fb e t t e r
health is to raise output per capita by roughly 15% relative to the base-
line of no health improvement. In the sense that better health raises
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health provides economic benefits. However, both the magnitude and
timing of the effect are disappointing from this perspective. An in-
crease in life expectancy from 40 to 60 is a major health improvement,
and our simulation says that such an improvement would have a very
small effect on the income gap between the typical rich and poor
countries. Further, for the first 30 years following a health improve-
ment, income per capita is lower than it would have been had health
not improved.
We now turn to an examination of the sensitivity of these basic results
to some of the modeling choices and parameters that we have used.
A. The Effect of Health on Productivity
As discussed above, our base case analysis uses an estimate of the effect
of health on labor productivity (the ASR measure) based on estimates in
Weil (2007). We also have an alternative measure of these productivity
effects built up from information on years of life lost to disability (the
YLD measure). Figure 6 shows the paths of output per capita following
a health improvement for these two cases and also for the case in which
we assume a zero effect of health on worker productivity. In all cases,
the paths of population, schooling, and labor force experience are the
Fig. 6. Effect of health on income per capita
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sults because the positive effect on health human capital is only about
half as large. After 15 years, income falls by more than one and a half
times as in the ASR case, and recovery is much more protracted, taking
about 50 years rather than 35 years. The long‐run positive effect is
about half as large as the ASR measure.
The fact that income per capita scarcely rises at all in the long run for
the “no health” case indicates that the favorable effects of health on
schooling, experience, and the dependency ratio alone roughly are
equal in magnitude to the negative effect of increased population,
working through greater pressure on the fixed factor.
B. The Phase‐in of Health Improvements
In our base case, we assumed a value for η, the parameter that describes
the phase‐in of productivity benefits from health improvements, of one‐
half. This means that people already alive at the time of an improve-
m e n ti nh e a l t hr e c e i v eh a l fo ft h eb e n e f i tt h a ta c c r u e st ot h o s ew h o
are born afterward. Figure 7 shows the path of income per capita in this
base case along with paths for the cases of η ¼ 0a n dη ¼ 1. By construc-
tion, the steady states of these three scenarios are the same, since even-
tuallyallthepeoplealiveatthetimeofthehealthimprovementhavedied.
Fig. 7. The phase‐in effect on income per capita
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born, the negative effect of health on income is little more than double
the baseline case, with a fall of about 8.5% after 15 years. However, the
dynamics are little affected, with income per capita recovering to the
baseline only 5 years later than in the base case scenario.
In contrast, the dynamics are markedly different if those currently
alive receive all the benefits of a health shock. The positive effects on
human capital are large enough to entirely offset the capital shallowing
that results from the larger population, with income in all years after
the shock greater than in the no‐shock case, although by a very small
margin for the period from 10 to 30 years after the shock when the
capital‐shallowing and dependency effects are at their greatest.
C. The Returns to Schooling and Experience
Figures 8 and 9 highlight the role of experience and the return to school-
ing in the model. We show the path of output in the base case and then
the results of setting the return to experience to zero (holding fixed the
return to schooling) in figure 8 and setting the return to schooling to
different possible levels (holding fixed the return to experience) in fig-
ure 9. Accounting for the human capital acquired through experience
somewhat increases the amplitude of the changes following the shock.
Fig. 8. Effect of worker experience on income per capita
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case during the period from 15 to 50 years after the change in health,
because during this time the average age of the labor force is below its
base case level. After that, however, the long‐run shift in the age struc-
ture of the population is toward slightly older workers. In the steady
state, income per capita is higher (by about 1.7%) in the case in which
experience is accounted for than in the case in which it is ignored.
In the case of education, our base case assumption was that the re-
turn to additional education was 13.4% per year, which is consistent
with initial education being below 4 years. Indeed, this may have been
reasonable for some countries at the time of the international epidemio-
logical transition; but if we look forward, there are few countries in the
world with education this low today. We show alternative paths for the
simulation using lower returns to education (i.e., 10.1% and 6.8%) and
for the case in which the return to education is zero.
The key point concerning all these results is that, although the long‐
run effects of the shock on the economy naturally differ, the dynamic
effects of the shock are almost identical regardless of the assumed re-
turns to education. The income loss at 15 years is exactly the same
(since none of the new workers affected by schooling have yet entered
the labor force), and regaining the no‐shock income level occurs only
5 years later if there are no returns to schooling at all than if there are
the relatively high returns assumed in our baseline case.
Fig. 9. Effect of schooling on income per capita
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Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) explain their finding that health im-
provements did not result in economic growth during the international
epidemiological transition by arguing that population growth undid
any direct positive effects of health. In our model, these population ef-
fects run through crowding of land, temporary reductions in capital per
worker, and a temporary rise of the dependency ratio.
Figures 10 and 11 show how the results are changed by changing the
horizon over which fertility adjusts. The base case assumed that it
would take 50 years for fertility to adjust to its new long‐run rate. Fifty
years seems broadly plausible, since conventional wisdom suggests
that demographic transition typically takes place over the course of
about two generations. However, estimates of the response of fertility
to mortality changes and the lag with which they occur are remarkably
imprecise and, moreover, subject to considerable regional variation. It is
commonly accepted, for example, that the African transition has been
unusually prolonged. Transition in Latin America and Asia, despite
their massively different social and economic circumstances, took a sim-
ilar amount of time, with widespread falls in fertility fairly apparent
by the 1980s (Cleland 2001). Therefore, the figures also show fertility
adjustments that take 25 years, which is perhaps a little closer to the
Fig. 10. Effect of adjustment speed on population size
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which is perhaps closer to the historical experience of Europe or the
experience of some sub‐Saharan African countries in the more recent
past (Lee et al. 2001). We also show the paths for the case in which
fertility adjusts instantaneously to the change in mortality and the
case in which fertility does not adjust at all for 50 years following the
shock and then adjusts in one jump to the level consistent with the pre-
shock level of population growth.
Figure 10 shows the path of population size under the different sce-
narios. Relative to the baseline in which there is no change in life expec-
tancy, the long‐run increases in population are 31%, 52%, and 76%,
respectively, as fertility takes 25, 50, and 75 years to adjust. Differences
in the rate of fertility adjustment become apparent only fairly gradually.
After 25 years, the population is 20%, 24%, and 26% bigger in the three
scenarios. After 50 years, however, the differences are apparent, with
the population increase being only 27% in the 25‐year adjustment case
but 42% in the base case and over 50% in the 75‐year adjustment case.
When fertility adjusts immediately to the change in mortality, there is
still a slight increase in population size relative to the baseline, reflect-
ing higher survival beyond childbearing years.
Figure 11 shows the corresponding paths for income per capita. Not
surprisingly, slower adjustment of fertility exaggerates the short‐run
fall in income per capita and reduces the long‐run increase. In the
Fig. 11. Effect of adjustment speed on income per capita
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after the shock is between 2.5% and 4%. Income per capita recovers to
thebaselinelevelafterabout20,35,and45yearsaftertheshock,respec-
tively. The long‐run economic benefits of improved health are also re-
duced when fertility is slower to adjust. The 25‐year adjustment case
leadstolong‐runincomegainsofabout18%,andthe 75‐yearadjustment
case raisesincomebyonlyabout13%.Theselong‐run effects run entirely
through the land‐labor ratio.
The population dynamics in our model are entirely generated by our
assumptions about fertility adjustment. An interesting exercise is to see
how they compare to the population dynamics underlying Acemoglu
andJohnson’s(2007)findings.Asafirststepwecanlookattheirestimate
of the effect of health improvements on population size. Specifically, we
look at the coefficient from a regression of change in log population size
from 1940 to 1980 on the change in log life expectancy over the same pe-
riod,wherethechangeinlifeexpectancyisinstrumentedusingpredicted
mortality. The coefficient is 1.67 with a standard error of 0.50 (table 8,
col. 1). The coefficient implies that an increase in life expectancy from 40
to 60 would raise population size by a factor of 1.97 over this 40‐year
period (using a coefficient two standard errors below their estimate im-
plies an increase in population size by 31% after 40 years). By contrast,
in our base case simulation, the effect on population after 40 years is a
36% increase, and even if we allow for a 75‐year adjustment for fertility,
the increase after 40 years is only 41%. Further, the simulation we run is
not fully comparable to the experience on which Acemoglu and Johnson
base their analysis, since we assume that the entire improvement in life
expectancy takes place instantly, whereas in reality the change was
phased in (although heavily weighted toward the beginning of the pe-
riod). Since Acemoglu and Johnson also report estimates of the share of
the population under 20, we can use this as an additional check on our
experiment.Theircoefficientis0.12,implyingthattheshareofthepopula-
tion under 20 is 4.9 percentage points higher than otherwise under our
shock. At a 40‐year horizon, in our base case the share of the population
under 20 peaks at 2.5 percentage points above the preshock level after
15 years, but by 40 years has almost exactly reached its preshock level.
What explains the failure of our simulated population to line up with
Acemoglu and Johnson’s estimates? One possibility is that the health im-
provement being studied (for which life expectancy is a proxy) affected
population not only through reduced mortality but also through higher
fertility. Higher fertility in this story would have to be the direct result of
better health (it could not be the result of higher income, since Acemoglu
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somesupport.Forexample,Lucas(2007a)findsthatmalariaeradicationin
Sri Lanka raised fertility, which is consistent with evidence that malaria
reduced fecundity.
AnotherpossibilityisthatthereissomethingwrongwiththeAcemoglu
and Johnson instrument for changes in life expectancy. If instrumented
increasesinlifeexpectancyproducemorepopulationgrowththancanbe
accounted for by the decline in mortality, it may be that the instrument is
correlated with the part of fertility not related to mortality. In other
words, countries with high mortalityr e d u c t i o n sm i g h ta l s oj u s th a v e
high levels offertility (or slowdeclinesin fertility). We do not have apar-
ticular theory that produces this correlation, but obviously if it is present
it also calls into question the other results that Acemoglu and Johnson
derive regarding the effect of life expectancy on income.
To see whether our results would match the Acemoglu and Johnson
results if our population path had matched theirs, we conducted the
following experiment: we used our demographic model to ask how
much fertility would have to jump up at the time of the mortality de-
cline (assuming that fertility then remained flat) in order to match the
Acemoglu‐Johnson finding that (for the mortality decline we consider)
populationwillbe1.97timesthebaselinelevelafter40years.Theanswer
is that fertility would have to rise by a factor of 1.24. We then fed this
demographic scenario through our economic model. The result is that
output per capita at a 40‐year horizon would be 20% below the base-
line (recall that in our base case scenario, output per capita at a horizon
of40yearsis2%abovethebaseline).Bycontrast,AcemogluandJohnson’s
coefficient from an instrumented regression of log GDP per capita on log




factors, in roughly equal proportions.
This is a convenient point at which to discuss the relationship between
our paper and those by Alwyn Young. Young (2005) simulates the ef-
fect of the AIDS epidemic in South Africa on per capita income, using
a Solow model, along with his own econometric estimates of changes
in the participation rate and fertility, and an assumption that orphans
accumulate no further human capital after they are orphaned. This ex-
ercise, and its successor concerning sub‐Saharan Africa (Young 2007),
are similar in spirit to the present work, although, since they concern
a particular disease, they can naturally be more precise about certain
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concerned with long‐run effects whereas we emphasize transition
paths. Our methodological approach is also somewhat different from
that of Young, in that we rely as heavily as possible on well‐identified
econometric estimates produced by otherauthorsratherthan onproduc-
ing our own estimates.
Although the approach in Young’s papers is broadly similar to that in
ours and although we share his assumption that reductions in health
reduce human capital accumulation, we differ from him crucially in
ourassumptionsconcerningfertility.Young’sworkisimportantandsur-
prising because it argues that a massive increase in mortality actually re-
duces fertility, precisely the opposite of the normal assumption, that
increases in mortality increase fertility. Young’s views on the effect of
HIV/AIDS on fertility are not uncontroversial, and Kalemli‐Ozcan
(2008) makes precisely the contrary argument, that the epidemic has
caused an increase in fertility. There may be a number of mechanisms
at work, including a decline in the demand for unprotected sexual activ-
ity, emphasized in Young (2005), and an independent decline in demand
forchildren(Young2007).Noneofthemechanismsinquestion,however,
are likely to shed light on the response of fertility to changes in the gen-
eral infectious disease environment or to malaria or tuberculosis in par-
ticular.Forexample,HIV/AIDSmayreducedemandforchildrenamong
infected parents concerned that their children are likely to be orphaned
young. This is unlikely to be a factor in the case of malaria, which has
relatively little effect on adults in infected areas. Similarly, the long inter-
val between HIV infection and the development of AIDS presumably
leaves more time for changes in fertility behavior than the relatively
quick onset of adult tuberculosis.
E. The Role of Land in the Production Function
Our base case treatment of land involved assuming both a particular
functional form (Cobb‐Douglas; in other words, unit elasticity of sub-
stitution) and a particular exponent on land in the production function.
In this subsection we relax both of these assumptions. We adopt a con-
stantelasticityofsubstitutionproductionfunctioninwhichwecanspecify
an elasticity of substitution between a capital‐labor‐technology compos-
ite factor, on the one hand, and the fixed factor on the other:
Yt ¼½ ð 1   aÞðAtKα
t H1 α
t Þ
ðσ 1Þ=σ þ aXðσ 1Þ=σ 
σ=ðσ 1Þ;
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ginal product, then its share of national income at time t,  , will be
 t ¼
aXðσ 1Þ=σ
ð1   aÞðAtKα
t H1 α
t Þ
ðσ 1Þ=σ þ aXðσ 1Þ=σ
:
If the elasticity of substitution is not unity, the fixed factor’s share of na-
tional income will vary as capital and human capital are accumulated,
population grows, and technology improves. For example, if σ > 1, so
thatotherfactorscansubstituteforthefixedfactor,thenthefixedfactor’s
share of income will decline over time. Thus, one should be able to learn
about the elasticity of substitution, at least in a gross sense, by observing
howtheincomeshareofthefixedfactorchangesovertime,asA,K,andH
accumulate.
Figure 12 shows data for doing such an analysis. The horizontal
axis measures output per worker. The data on the vertical axis are es-
timates of the income share of nonreproducible factors of production,
from Caselli and Feyrer (2007).
6 The Caselli and Feyrer estimates are
in turn built on data from the World Bank (2005) on the values of phys-
ical capital, cropland, pasture land, and subsoil resources. In the cross
section, there is a clear negative relationship between the level of output
and the share of the fixed factor. Combining the production function
Fig. 12. Fixed factor income share and output per worker
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everything in per‐worker terms, and rearranging, we get
lnð iÞ¼lnðaÞ 








where xi is fixed resources per worker and yi is output per worker, and
we are now considering a cross section of countries. The results (with
standard errors in parentheses) from running this regression are





; R2 ¼ 0:56:
ð0:069Þð 0:071Þ
The implied value of σ, the elasticity of substitution, is 2.35 with a 95%
confidence interval of [1.56, 3.13]. We know of few estimates of this pa-
rameter to compare to our own. Nordhaus and Tobin (1972, app. B),
using time‐series data for the United States over the period 1909–58
on capital and labor stocks and the income share of natural resources,
estimate the elasticity of substitution between land and a labor‐capital
aggregate as 2.02.
Figure 12 is also informative about the share of fixed factors in na-
tional income. Our base case, in which the land share is 10%, is prob-
ably quite conservative for most developing countries. Other evidence
also suggests this. In a well‐known study, Hansen and Prescott (2002)
assume a value of 30% for preindustrial economies. Accordingly, a sen-
sitivity analysis that increases land’s share of national income to 20% or
even 30% seems reasonable for at least some developing countries.
The production function can be rewritten to show how total output
compares at two points in time, as the quantities of physical and human

















To do this comparison, one does not need to know the quantity of the
fixed factor X or the parameter a, but only the income share of the fixed
factor at a point in time, the elasticity of substitution, and the growth of
the inputs into production, all of which we were already measuring. We
use a value of α ¼ 1
3, which is consistent with our earlier parameteriza-
tion of giving capital a 0.3 exponent when the land share is 10%.
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income share of land is increased from 10% to 20% and 30%. There are
significant differences between the three simulations in GDP per capita
following the shock. In comparison to the base case, it takes income an
additional 15 years to recover to its preshock level under a 20% income
share of land. A recovery never occurs when land’s share is 30%. The
simulations also have markedly different implications for the long‐run
gains from improvements in health. For instance, doubling the share of
land more than halves the long‐run gains in per capita income from im-
proved health, which go from about 16% to 6%. Naturally, the longer
fertility takes to adjust, the more pronounced this effect will be.
We now turn to the elasticity of substitution between the fixed factor
and other inputs to production. Intuitively, the greater this substitut-
ability, the less severe the consequences of increased population pres-
s u r eo nt h ef i x e df a c t o rf o l l o w i n gt h es h o c k .F i g u r e1 4s h o w sh o w
varying the elasticity parameter σ influences our findings by compar-
ing our base case scenario with results obtained under σ ¼ 0:75, where
land is more complementary than in the Cobb‐Douglas case, and under
σ ¼ 2, whereland is moresubstitutable. While it takes income per capita
about 50 years following the shock to recover to its preshock level under
σ ¼ 0:75, this recovery occurs in25 yearswhen landistwice assubstitut-
ableasintheCobb‐Douglascase.Moreover,thelong‐rungainsinincome
per capita also increase with greater substitutability of the fixed factor,
Fig. 13. Effect of land share on income per capita
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unity in the Cobb‐Douglas case.
Finally, we consider a case that may be relevant for many resource‐
richdevelopingcountries,inwhichthereisalargeresourceextractionsec-
torthatislargelydetachedfromtherestoftheeconomy.Specifically,weset
the resource share in national income to 40% and the elasticity of sub-
stitution between resources and other inputs to infinity. Coincidentally,
thesetwochangesalmostexactlycanceleachotherout,sothatthepathof
income looks very similar to our base case. Income per capita has the
same initial dip as in the base case and regains its initial baseline after
30 years, as compared to 35 years in the base case. After 50 years, income
per capita is 9.0% above the baseline, as compared to 6.5% in the base
case.
F. International Capital Flows
An important part of our results is driven by the assumption of Solovian
saving. It is possible to adjust this assumption in a straightforward way
even without building a life cycle savings model, simply by assuming that
the economy is open to international capital flows that equalize the re-
turn to capital around the world, at least up to a country fixed effect.
7
Figures 15 (capital per worker) and 16 (income per capita) show that
allowing for capital flows (assuming a fixed world interest rate) does
Fig. 14. Effect of land substitutability on income per capita
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8 In the closed‐economy case, cap-
i t a lp e rw o r k e rf a l l sm o n o t o n i c a lly to a minimum of about 90% of the
baseline 30 years after the shock. In the open‐economy case, capital per
worker stays close to the no‐s h o c kc a s eo v e rt h ef i r s tc o u p l eo fd e c a d e s
aftertheshock.Thereasonisthattheeffectsofincreasedhumancapital,
Fig. 15. Effect of international capital flows on capital per worker
Fig. 16. Effect of international capital flows on income per capita
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ing in, whereas there is a significant drag on returns to capital from the
presenceofthefixedfactor.Fromabout25yearsaftertheshock,however,
theeffectsofincreasedhumancapitalbegintomakethemselvesfeltmore
strongly, and the capital stock quickly converges to its long‐run level,
about 13% higher than in the no‐shock baseline. Thirty‐five years after
the health improvement,incomepercapitais 5%above the baselinepath
in the case of an economy open to capital flows, whereas it has barely
regained the baseline level in the closed economy. Even 65 years after
the shock, income per capita is 5% higher in the open economy than in
the economy reliant on domestic savings.
The most important question to ask about this case is whether capital
flows of the magnitude envisaged could be sustained by developing
economies. Figure 17 shows the resulting current‐account deficit as a
percentage of GDP, and figure 18 the size of foreign capital required
over the period, both as a percentage of GDP and of total capital.
The current‐account deficit resulting from this source of capital inflow
spikes at 2.5% of GDP in the first 5 years after the shock, as the produc-
tivity of current workers jumps from the improvement in health. The
current‐account deficit then declines for a decade before rising to about
1% of GDP for several decades as a result of the health‐induced rise in
population growth. The ratio of foreign debt to GDP peaks about half a
century after the shock, at about 25% (equivalent to 15% of the capital
Fig. 17. The current‐account deficit as a percentage of income
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they are not small increments to the respective measures and so could
well be difficult to sustain in countries with substantial accumulated
debt, whether public or private. Accordingly, the open‐economy results
highlight the importance of maintaining institutions and policies favor-
able to foreign investment, including, but not limited to, avoiding sub-
stantial government indebtedness.
G. “Best‐Case” and “Worst‐Case” Scenarios
The reader can see from the above exercises how varying individual
assumptions of our simulation model affects the results. Obviously it
is possible to vary more than one assumption at a time, and the effects
of doing this will not likely be simply a sum of the results from varying
them individually. There is no problem running such scenarios through
our simulator. The difficulty is in summarizing the immense number of
potential results. Here we consider two scenarios of interest.
We start by considering a “best case” for the effects of health on
growth. That is, we choose parameters that give the largest effect of
health on growth while at the same time being reasonable within the
framework that we have constructed. Specifically, in comparison to the
base case, we make the following adjustments. We set the speed of fer-
tility adjustment to 25 years, set the elasticity of substitution between
Fig. 18. The evolution of foreign capital
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10%), and consider the case of an economy open to capital flows from
abroad. We leave the treatment of experience and schooling at their base
case values (the latter is already arguably optimistic). Finally, for the ef-
fectofhealthonworkerproductivity,weassumeavalueofη ¼ 1,imply-
ing that improvements in health are reflected in worker productivity
right away. In this scenario, income per capita rises immediately by
10% in response to the health improvement as shown in figure 19. After
40years,incomeis21%abovethebaseline,andinthesteadystateincome
is 25% higher than the baseline. Compared to the base case, the best‐case
scenario tells a significantly more positive story about the ability of
health improvements to raise the standard of living. This being said,
however, even in this case the response of income to health is far lower
than one would expect from popular pronouncements on the issue.
The second scenario we consider is a “worst case,” designed to mini-
mize the effect of health on economic growth, again subject to the con-
straint of picking parameters that seem to us somewhat reasonable.
Specifically, we set the speed of fertility adjustment to 75 years, land’s
exponent in the production function to 0.3, the elasticity of substitution
between land and other factors to one, and the parameter governing the
phase‐in of productive effects of health (η) to zero, implying that only
those born after the health improvement have increased productivity.
We consider the case of an economy closed to international capital
Fig. 19. The best‐case scenario for income per capita
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benefits of better health rather than the “ASR” method used in our stan-
dard simulations. Figure 20 shows the results. With these parameters,
our standard improvement in health lowers income per capita not only
in the short run (as in the base case scenario) but in the long run as well.
At a 40‐year horizon, income per capita is 13.4% below its baseline
path. Although this scenario certainly contradicts the conventional wis-
dom that health improvements lead to economic growth, it still does
not match the findings of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Recall that
in their analysis, the mortality improvement considered here would
lower GDP per capita by 41% after 40 years.
IV. Disease Eradication
Thus far in the paper, the health improvement that we have been con-
sidering has been an increase in life expectancy at birth from 40 to
60years,whichismeanttoroughlymatchtheinternationalepidemiolog-
ical transition that took place in the decades following World War II.
The components of that transition included the widespread availability
of antibiotics, new vaccines, the use of DDT, and the creation of public
health infrastructure in a large number of countries. The improvement
in life expectancy resulted fromprogress against many different diseases
Fig. 20. The worst‐case scenario for income per capita
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labor productivity and human capital accumulation.
We now examine the effects of more specific health improvements.
That is, we look at the effects of eradicating specific diseases. We also
adopt a prospective rather than a historical approach. In other words,
we start from the current health conditions and ask how things would
change if the disease environment were altered. The pairing of the dis-
ease‐specific and prospective approaches (and similarly the general
health and historical approaches) is not a logical necessity. We could
use our model to ask about general health improvements starting from
the current situation or, similarly, about what the effect was of progress
against specific diseases in the past. We adopt the approach we do out
of considerations of data availability and policy relevance.
The two diseases we consider are malaria and tuberculosis. Both are
major killers in developing countries, and both are at the center of re-
cent international efforts. (The third disease that naturally falls into this
category is HIV/AIDS. However, this disease presents a number of
complications that make it too difficult for us to deal with for now.)
In both cases, we consider the effect of immediately eradicating the dis-
ease in question. Disease reductions that fell short of complete eradica-
tion, or which were phased in gradually, would obviously have effects
that were smaller than those shown here.
We apply our model to demographic data from Zambia, which is
fairly representative of sub‐Saharan Africa as a whole. In 2001, its life
expectancy at birth was 37 years. Malaria was the cause of about 8.3%
of deaths in Zambia, compared with a sub‐Saharan average of 9.8%.
Tuberculosis was a little more severe than the sub‐Saharan average,
causing about 3.1% of deaths compared with 2.0% on average.
Eradicating tuberculosis raises life expectancy at birth from 37.0 years
to 38.0 years. Eliminating malaria would raise life expectancy at birth to
38.6 years. These gains in life expectancy at birth are very small com-
pared to the 20 years that characterized the international demographic
transition in the previous experiment. Their economic effects will natu-
rally also be substantially smaller.
Applying our simulation model to specific diseases requires several
modifications. When we considered general improvements in health,
we used data on mortality (i.e., life expectancy at birth) as an indicator
of morbidity, that is, how healthy the surviving population was. Indi-
vidual diseases, however, will not have the same relative effects on
morbidity and mortality as the general health improvement that we
considered above. For example, among adults, malaria has a large effect
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diseases,wedecouple morbidity and mortality. We use direct measuresof
the morbidity effects of individual diseases as well as their age‐specific
mortality profiles. We also alterourtreatment ofthe effect ofdiseaseprev-
alence on school completion (in the case of malaria, but not tuberculosis)
to take advantage of good estimates of this particular effect.
The pieces of our model other than demographics, productivity ef-
fects of disease, and schooling effects of disease are the same as those
discussed above.
A. Demographic Effects of Disease Eradication
The preshock mortality regime is generated from life table data for
Zambia in 2001, obtained from the WHO. To simulate the appropriate
shocks, we use data from the WHO on disease‐specific deaths to create
the corresponding cause‐deleted life tables, which are then applied in
the respective scenarios to project the population from the shock period
(i.e., year 0) onward.
9 For preshock fertility, we use age‐specific fertility
rates reported for Zambia in 2001 by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Interna-
tional Data Base.
Figure 21 shows the level of the population following the eradication
of the diseases. Since malaria accounts for a greater fraction of mortality
Fig. 21. Effect of disease eradication on population size
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not surprisingly the increase in population resulting from its eradica-
tion is also larger: about 5% in the long run compared with about
2.7% in the long run for tuberculosis. In both cases, around 80% of
the extra population growth occurs in the first 40 years after the shock.
Figure 22 shows the most substantial economic difference in the effect
of eliminating the two diseases. Eliminating malaria causes the depen-
dencyratiotoincreasebyabout2.6%overthefollowing15years,whereas
eliminating tuberculosis causes the dependency ratio to fall more or less
continuously for the next 60 years, including on impact. It is worth noting
that the dependency ratio implied by the Zambian life tables is signifi-
cantly higher before the shock than that implied by the South Asian
model life tables in the earlier experiment. Before the shock, the depen-
dency ratio is about 0.95 using these life tables, compared with only
about 0.69 in the previous experiment.
B. The Direct Effect of Disease on Labor Productivity
To measure the effects of eradicating specific diseases on labor produc-
tivity, we use data on age‐specific disease prevalence from the Global
Burden of Disease (GBD) project (Murray and Lopez 1996). The data
apply to sub‐Saharan Africa. In the case of malaria, we look at both
episodes of the disease and the neurological sequelae that result from
Fig. 22. Effect of disease eradication on the dependency ratio
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tion of a year that the average person in an age group experiences a
disease. In the case of malaria episodes, for example, 17.5% of adults
experience an episode every year; but duration is quite short, so the prev-
alenceofthediseaseisonly0.25%.Bycontrast,neurologicalsequelaehave
no incidence among adults but a prevalence of more than 0.5% because
they last a lifetime.
In principle, the data on prevalence should be combined with a dis-
ability weight to produce a measure of how much of the adult popula-
tion’s labor input is lost as a result of a particular disease. However, as
discussed above, we are not fully confident that the disability weights
used by the GBD project, which are meant to measure the utility cost of
diseases, are appropriate as measures of the effect of disease on labor
input. Further, as will be seen below, our results show extremely small
economic effects of disease eradication. Thus, we err on the conserva-
tive side and simply assign a disability weight of one to malaria (both
episodes and sequelae) and tuberculosis. That is, we assume that an af-
fected individual supplies no labor input at all.
Our direct observation of disease prevalence eliminates the need to
make assumptions about the phase‐in of productive benefits from
health improvements (the parameter η) that we did in the case of gen-
eral health. The duration of malaria episodes is very short, and even
episodes of tuberculosis have a duration short enough that we can
ignore it in examining the effects of eradication. Thus we assume that
upon impact, the prevalence of malaria episodes and tuberculosis goes
to zero; in the case of malaria sequelae, we assume that children born
after eradication are free of sequelae, whereas those born before retain
the pre‐eradication prevalence as they age.
C. The Effect of Disease Eradication on Schooling
Several papers have examined the effect of malaria and its eradication
on both schooling and human capital accumulation more generally.
This focus on schooling and human capital occurs for several reasons.
First, malaria exerts a particularly heavy burden on children; in areas
where malaria is endemic, adults develop partial immunity. Second,
there have been several cases in which malaria has been rapidly eradi-
cated or at least greatly reduced. These cases provide good identifying
variation that can be used to estimate malaria’s effects.
Lucas (2007a) examines malaria eradication in Sri Lanka. Rapid de-
ployment of DDT in the years after World War II along with preexisting
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for a differences‐in‐differences comparison of education in cohorts born
before and after eradication. The measure of malaria in her data is the
“spleen rate,” which is the percentage of school‐age children with pal-
pably enlarged spleens. She estimates that reducing the spleen rate
from 100% to zero would raise primary education by 1.79 years.
Spleen rate is no longer used as a measure of malaria. Lucas (2007b)
reports the malaria incidence rate in Zambia in 1999 as 33.1%. She also
uses time‐series data from Sri Lanka to estimate a mapping from inci-
dence to spleen rates, which implies that Zambia in 1999 had a spleen
rate of 10.3%. Multiplying this spleen rate by Lucas’s coefficient says
that eradicating malaria in Zambia would increase years of primary
school by 0.18 year. Recall that our estimate was that an increase in gen-
eral health that raised life expectancy at birth by 20 years raised school-
ing by 0.386 year and that we estimate that the eradication of malaria
would raise life expectancy by only 1.6 years. Thus the effect of malaria
on education is indeed greatly out of proportion to its effect on life
expectancy.
10
The relatively large effect on schooling of eradicating malaria that we
get from Lucas is supported by the estimates in several other papers.
Bleakley (2007b) estimates even larger effects of malaria on individual
income and schooling. He estimates that, per infection, malaria reduces
income by about 40%, with about one‐q u a r t e ro ft h a te f f e c tc o m i n g
from schooling—that is, roughly 1 year of schooling per malaria infec-
tion. With an incidence rate in Zambia of about one‐third, the implied
gain in average years of schooling is about one‐quarter, which is quite
similar to the Lucas estimate we use above.
D. Disease Eradication Effects on Income per Capita
Figure 23 shows the paths of income per capita in the two eradication
scenarios, compared to a baseline in which there is no change to health.
The long‐run effects are roughly similar: income per capita rises by 2%.
The short‐run paths are quite different, however. In the case of malaria
eradication, income per capita initially dips to almost 1.5% below its
pre‐eradication level and does not get back to its pre‐eradication level
until some 40 years into the simulation. In the case of tuberculosis, by
contrast, income rises immediately.
The differing demographic impact of the two diseases is part of the ex-
planation for the divergent income paths. As figure 24 shows, income
per worker falls less in response to malaria eradication than income per
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Fig. 24. Effect of disease eradication on income per workercapita does because of the increase in dependency that malaria eradica-
tion produces. In the long run, income per worker is higher for malaria
eradication than in the case of tuberculosis eradication, but income per
capitaisequalizedbecausethepopulationwithtuberculosiseradicated
has a higher percentage of working‐age adults. There are also interesting
differences in the path of capital per worker, as shown in figure 25. Capi-
talperworkerdeclinesimmediatelyinthecaseoftuberculosiseradication
since fewer working‐age adults are dying. There is a larger, but more
delayed, decline in capital per worker in the case of malaria eradication
as the cohort of children who would havedied from the diseaseenter the
labor force.
The other source of the difference in the dynamic responses to eradi-
cation of malaria and tuberculosis is how they affect human capital.
This is shown in figure 26. In the case of tuberculosis, the biggest effect
of eradication is on the productivity of workers. Table 2 shows that the
prevalence of tuberculosis among adults is around 0.6%. Eradicating
the disease immediately frees up this productive labor. By contrast, the
prevalence of malaria episodes among adults is much lower, and eradi-
catingmalariahasonlyadelayedeffectontheprevalenceofneurological
sequelae among adults. The part of the human capital increase that re-
sults from increased schooling, and thus takes a generation or more to
phasein,ismuchhigherformalaria.Malariaeradicationraisesschooling
by 0.18 year, which accounts for most of the long‐run increase in human
Fig. 25. Effect of disease eradication on capital per worker
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0–4 120,000 1,644 .01 559
5–14 17,500 240 .01 42
15–44 17,500 240 .01 33
45–59
17,500 240 .01 36
Malaria—Neurological Sequelae
0–4 164 365 37.1 0
5–14 0 701 ……




0–4 85 108 2.0 42
5–14 135 251 2.0 22
15–44 284 552 2.0 92
45–59 339 670 2.0 182
Source: Murray and Lopez (1996).
Fig. 26. Effect of disease eradication on human capital per workercapitalfromeradication.Theincreaseinschoolingfromeradicatingtuber-
culosisisonly0.09year.Finally,eradicatingtuberculosisreducesmortality
mainly among prime‐age workers, thereby skewing the age distribution
of the population toward relatively more experienced workers. As a re-
sult, the long‐run increase in human capital in the form of experience is
about four times as great as that of eradicating malaria.
The most important thing to note about our estimates is that the eco-
nomic benefits of disease reduction are both small and, in the case of
malaria, long in coming. These results stand in stark contrast to the as-
sessmentsoftheeconomiceffectsofmalariadiscussedintheintroduction.
The discussion of the sensitivity of our results to altering the parameteri-
zation of the model, conducted in Section III in the case of general health
improvement, can be carried over to this examination of individual dis-
eases. Changing our assumptions about land’s role in production, the
openness ofthe economy tocapital flows,and the speed offertility adjust-
ment can increase the estimated benefits of disease reductions, but not by
enough to match the estimates quoted above.
Aswedid forthe general improvementinhealth analyzed earlierinthe
paper, we can examine the effect of disease eradication under a best‐case
set of parameters that maximize (within reason) the effect of health on in-
come per capita.
11 The results are shown in figure 27. For malaria, income
percapitareturnstoitsbaselinelevelafter25years,ratherthan40yearsin
thebasecase,andthetotalriseis3%,versus2%inthebasecase.Theresults
Fig. 27. The best‐case scenario for income per capita with disease eradication
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show an economic effect of disease eradication that is quite small.
As in our analysis of the effect of a general improvement in health,
not every possible channel by which malaria or tuberculosis affects the
economy is included in our analysis. In the case of malaria, two effects
that are often mentioned are, first, reductions in agricultural productiv-
ity that result from farmers choosing land and/or crops in order to
avoid exposure to the disease and, second, the effect of even low levels
of disease in preventing some industries, most notably tourism, from
getting started in a region. Beyond this, it may be that frequent absences
produced by malaria result in a reduction in productivity that is greatly
out of proportion to the number of days lost. We do not have good ways
of incorporating any of these effects into our simulations.
V. Concluding Remarks
Using a simulation model, we explore the economic effects of an exog-
enous change in population health. The model allows for a direct effect
of health on worker productivity, as well as indirect effects that run
through schooling, the size and age structure of the population, capital
accumulation, and crowding of fixed natural resources. We also model
the dynamic processes of phase‐in of health improvements and the ad-
justment of fertility to a change in mortality that accompanies better
health. Our analysis shows that for reasonable parameters, the period
before any beneficial effects of an improvement in health are visible in
GDP per capita can be quite long, on the order of a third of a century. It
may take twice that long to achieve most of the long‐run gains in income
per capita resulting from increased health. Further, these gains are sur-
prisingly small. An increase in life expectancy at birth from 40 to 60, in
our base case simulation, raises GDP per capita by roughly 15% in the
long run. When we examine the economic effects of eradicating specific
diseases,wegetsimilarresults:eliminatingeithermalariaortuberculosis
in the typical country in sub‐Saharan Africa would raise GDP per capita
by only 2% in the long run.
Our simulation model is parameterized using a combination of micro-
economic estimates of the effect of health on schooling and worker pro-
ductivity, data on demographics and disease burdens in developing
countries, aggregate measures of the natural resource share in national
income, and standard components of quantitative macroeconomic theory.
Thepaperdiscusseshowvariationsintheparameterizationoftheeconom-
ic environment affect our results. No reasonable variation that we could
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magnitude that are commonly found in policy discussions of this issue.
The long lag with which health affects income per capita, along with
the relatively modest long‐run effect, may explain one of the more
puzzling phenomena regarding cross‐country inequality. While cross‐
country inequality in health declined rapidly over the period 1950–90
(i.e., up through the advent of the AIDS epidemic), cross‐country in-
equality in income did not.
The results from our analyses of health’s effect on economic growth
will have a number of uses. Considerations of economic effects are al-
ready an important part of discussions of and advocacy for programs to
improve population health. While health improvements may well raise
workerproductivity,manypotentialinterventionsindevelopingcountries
will also be accompanied by the side effect of a rapidly growing popula-
tion, which will have negative economic effects over a significant time
horizon. An understanding of the demographic dynamics that accom-
pany health improvements therefore suggests complementary policies
and investments. Encouraging foreign investment may help mitigate cap-
ital dilution arising from population pressure. Planning for extra teachers
andextraschooling facilities tocopewithalikelylargeincreaseinthenum-
berofschool‐agechildren wouldmitigate adverse effects of crowdingon
human capital accumulation. Similarly, family‐planning policies involv-
ing education or the availability of modern contraceptive methods are
likely to limit the extent of population growth. Policies such as these
can greatly improve the rate at which improvements in health are trans-
lated into improvements in the standard of living.
It is appropriate, though, to end on a note of caution. That improve-
ments in health may temporarily (or even permanently) reduce income
per capita is not a reason not to pursue such improvements, which are
valuable in themselves. Similarly, family‐planning policies need to be
considered in the context of welfare analysis rather than simply through
the lens of their effects on income percapita. This study is therefore com-
plementary to the consideration of the welfare analysis of development
policies, not a substitute for it.
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1. http:/ /www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_health/id/malaria/publications/docs/
abuja.pdf. See Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) and Weil (2007) for more discussion of this
literature.
2. Forsimplicity,ourdemographicprojectionsareperformedonaclosed,female‐onlypop-
ulation. Considering a population of both males and females, however, would not qualita-
tively alter the results of our model as long as the sex ratio at birth remains fixed over time.
3. Formally, a population composed of n age groups is represented by an n‐dimensional
vector Nt that evolves according to
Ntþ1 ¼ Pb   Nt if t < T
Pa   Nt otherwise;
 
wherePb andPa arethen   nprojectionmatricesbeforeandaftertheshock,N0 > 0isgiven,
andtheshockperiod,T,isdeterminedto occurafterthepreshockpopulationhasattaineda
stableagestructureandrateof growth.A populationprojectionmatrixiscomposedof age‐
specificnet maternityratesalongthefirst rowand age‐specificsurvivorship ratesalongthe
subdiagonal. The stable population growth rate implied by a projection matrix is given by
its largest, real eigenvalue and the stable age structure by the corresponding eigenvector.
4. Young (2005) makes the same assumption in his analysis of HIV/AIDS in South
Africa. An alternative would be to build in a life cycle model of saving, although there
is considerable controversy about the applicability of such models to developing coun-
tries. See Deaton (1999) and Lee et al. (2001).
5. Some examples of disability weights are blindness (0.600), deafness (0.216), HIV
(0.136), AIDS (0.505), tuberculosis seronegative for HIV (0.264), severe iron deficiency ane-
mia (0.093), malaria episodes (0.172), and neurological sequelae of malaria (0.473).
6. Specifically, we use αw   αk, where the former is the income share of all nonhuman
factors and the latter is the share of reproducible capital.
7. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) make a strong case that marginal products of capital are
almost completely equalized around the world.
8. We simulate international capital flows in the following manner. Prior to the health im-
provement shock, capital accumulates in the usual closed‐economy Solovian fashion. Note
thatthis isequivalentto assumingthattheeconomyisopen tointernational capital flowsbut
has a domestic savings rate such that there is no inflow in the preshock steady state. In other
words, the marginal product of domestic capital in the preshock steady state is equal to the
fixed world interest rate. Once the shock is applied, however, capital accumulates in such a
fashion as to maintain its preshock steady‐state marginal product over time.
9. Strictly, we scale data on age‐specific causes of death in sub‐Saharan Africa by the
population prevalenceof thatcause of death in Zambiacomparedwith sub‐SaharanAfrica
as a whole, since data on age‐specific causes of death in Zambia are not available.
10. Lucas also finds that malaria eradication had a positive effect on fertility on impact.
She shows that this effect worked through increased probability of a first birth, suggest-
ing that the biological effect of malaria eradication in raising fecundity (the ability to have
a child) was more important than any decline in desired fertility due to higher child sur-
vival. We do not incorporate this effect in our simulations, but if we did it would clearly
lower the economic benefits of malaria eradication.
11. The best‐case assumptions are the same as in Sec. III, except that we do not make an
assumption about the speed of phase‐in of health improvements (η) when we are dealing
with disease eradication.
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